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THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND UNPROTECTED GROUPS:
IS THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION EXPANDING UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
David Shea Bettwy ∗
INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 1948 (Genocide Convention) provides that genocide is a crime
that is perpetrated on “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” 1
The exhaustive list of protected groups is the product of considerable
deliberation and forethought by the drafters and has sustained itself through
subsequent corresponding codification at both the domestic and international
levels. At the same time, the list has been the subject of considerable criticism
and debate concerning its narrowness. 2 By virtue of the fact that norms of
customary international law, apart from conventional law, are binding on all
states that have not persistently objected, it is worth investigating whether
there exists a trend toward a larger scope of protected groups as a matter of
customary law. International case law and state practice, for example, have in
several instances challenged the exclusiveness of the Genocide Convention’s
list. Such an investigation reveals that sources of custom contain only
scattered suggestions of a broader interpretation of protected groups. So, it
does not appear that customary international law has enlarged the scope of
protected groups set forth in the Genocide Convention, with the possible
exception of indigenous peoples.
Part II of this Article explains the relevance and importance of
monitoring customary international law concerning genocide. Then, using the
ejusdem generis 3 approach, Part III analyzes the characteristics of protected
groups under the Genocide Convention to derive three primary common
characteristics.
Part IV applies customary international law to those
characteristics to determine whether additional groups are entitled to
protection.
The Article concludes, as stated above, that customary
∗

LL.M., International Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway; B.A.,
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1
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter
Genocide Convention].
2
See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (2d ed. 2009).
3
See id. at 150 (“General rules of interpretation would suggest an ejusdem generis
approach; . . . ‘[additional] groups’ must in some way be similar to or analogous with those
that are enumerated.” (footnote omitted)).

167

168

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

international law is not developing toward protection of additional groups, with
the possible exception of indigenous peoples.
I.

THE RELEVANCE OF RE-EXAMINING CUSTOMARY LAW
A. Conception of Genocide

The nature of the term’s conception strongly suggests that genocide, the
destruction of “human groups,” 4 is a violation of customary international law,
which international convention confirms. In other words, the concept of
genocide is not an invention of international legislation. Genocide has been
described as “contrary to moral law” 5 and its translation into the legal
positivist sphere has involved a continuous struggle to devise a universal
definition that has practical application. The crime has been prevalent “at all
periods of history” 6 and the term “genocide” was not popularized until after
the 20th century atrocities in Nazi Germany. The “crime without a name” 7
was first labeled “genocide” in print in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin in Axis Rule
in Occupied Europe. 8 The term subsequently gained universal recognition by
way of the prosecutions of responsible Nazi members at the International
Military Tribunal, which led to the codification of its legal prohibition by the
United Nations. 9
The fact that the inception and subsequent defining of genocide—a
crime prevalent in all periods of history—in the 1940s was influenced
primarily by a single historical event raises questions at the present time
regarding the definition of genocide, given the prevalence of widespread
atrocities in our contemporary world. Indeed, the travaux préparatoires of the
Genocide Convention confirm that the drafters used the events of the Jewish
Holocaust as guidance in devising the legal definition. 10 Max du Plessis notes
that the definition of genocide provided in Article II of the Genocide
Convention reflects “a preoccupation among the drafters of the Convention
4

G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 96 (I)].
Id.; see Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) [hereinafter I.C.J. Advisory
Opinion].
6
Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at 278.
7
Sergey Sayapin, Raphael Lemkin: A Tribute, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1157, 1159 (2009)
(quoting Winston Churchill).
8
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 31–34.
9
See id. at 43–49; Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41
AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 147 (1947) (“The evidence produced at the Nuremberg trial gave full
support to the concept of genocide.” (footnote omitted)).
10
See Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide Proposed by the Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 5 April 1948, Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, art. I, U.N.
Doc. E/AC.25/7 (1948) (“The crime of genocide is organically bound up with Fascism-Nazism
. . . .”); U.N. ECOSOC, Report of the Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, 4th mtg. at 10–11, U.N.
Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4 (Apr. 15, 1948) (“The aim of the convention was to prevent a repetition of
the atrocities perpetrated during the last war.”).
5
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with the Nazi extermination of the Jews in World War II.” 11 David Nersessian
suggests the possibility that, in becoming protected groups under conventional
law, racial and religious groups in particular may have benefited from the
convenience of the historical context provided by the Jewish Holocaust. 12 If
accepted that the genocide is contrary to “moral law,” then its legal prohibition
is an evolving concept influenced by a continuous effort to address the truest
sense of the crime. Since the Genocide Convention is a codification of
genocide law as it existed in customary law 13 half a century ago, customary
law today may define genocide more broadly. As John Quigley notes, “a
conclusion that a particular situation involves genocide is not tantamount to
equating it with the Holocaust of World War II.” 14
Another compelling reason to reconsider customary law to investigate
the scope of protected groups is that a number of groups were excluded from
the protection of the Genocide Convention and their inclusion has been
debated by scholars and legislators as early as the drafting of the Convention.
Drafters did consider ideological, linguistic, economic, and political groups
before ultimately excluding them. 15 One of the first codifications of customary
law on the subject, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 96 (I), established a
non-exhaustive list of protected groups in 1946. 16 The resolution has been
referenced widely and deemed a relevant source of customary law. 17
Furthermore, many scholars from a variety of disciplines have proposed
definitions of genocide that entail a larger scope of protected groups. 18
B.

Conventional vis-à-vis Customary International Law

The consideration of customary law in addition to conventional law is
essential in international legal practice and, considering what is at stake, it is
certainly no less essential when trying to determine the scope of the definition
of the crime of genocide. Steven Ratner et al. note that “[t]he status of
genocide under customary international law is significant because it determines
11

Max du Plessis, ICC Crimes, in THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 35, 36
(Ben Brandon & Max du Plessis eds., 2005).
12
See DAVID NERSESSIAN, GENOCIDE AND POLITICAL GROUPS 62 (2010).
13
See Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. I (confirming the crime of genocide under
international law); I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, at 12 (“the principles underlying the
Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even
without any conventional obligation.”).
14
John Quigley, Introduction to GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA 1, 2 (Howard J. De Nike et al.
eds., 2000) [hereinafter GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA].
15
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 117.
16
See G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 4 (“[G]enocide is a crime . . . whether the crime is
committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds . . . .”).
17
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 56; see generally id., at 56 n.207 (listing instruments and
case law citing G.A. Res. 96 (I)).
18
See generally ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE 15–18 (2006) (listing proposed definitions from
notable scholars from 1959 to 2003, most of which describe targets of genocide as “groups” or
“collectivities” with flexible or no qualification).
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the obligations of all states . . . whether or not they are party to the
Convention.” 19 Oppenheim’s International Law affirms that “treaties have to
be interpreted and applied against the background of customary international
law.” 20 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) asserted that the codification
of principles “in multilateral conventions does not mean that they cease to exist
and to apply as principles of customary law, even as regards countries that are
parties to such conventions.” 21 In regards to the relationship between
convention and custom, Nersessian’s proposition that international law tends to
set “minimum standards for human rights” 22 suggests that convention
establishes, as Beth Van Schaack puts it, “only a basic minimum” 23 that
customary law may build upon. If the prohibition of genocide—specifically
the scope of protected groups—in customary law does not match squarely the
provisions of the Genocide Convention, then it follows that the legal
prohibition of genocide cannot rely solely on the provisions of the Genocide
Convention.
Van Schaack, a proponent of the inclusion of political groups among
the protected groups, points out that the practice of exercising universal
jurisdiction in prosecuting genocide suspects is an indication that at least one
significant aspect of the Genocide Convention has undergone expansion in
customary law. The drafting committee discussed the issue of jurisdiction and
ultimately rejected universal jurisdiction over crimes of genocide. 24 Article VI
of the Convention states that genocide suspects must be tried “by a competent
tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed” thereby
establishing the principle of territorial jurisdiction for genocide adjudication
and attempting to preclude the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 25 Schabas
describes this as a “great shortcoming,” noting that “where there was political
will, prosecutions on [the] basis [of universal jurisdiction] have proceeded.” 26
The Supreme Court of Israel asserted, in Israel v. Eichmann, that, in
spite of Article VI, States possess “the universal power . . . to prosecute for
crimes of this type” under customary international law. 27 Rather than
purporting to overrule a provision of the Genocide Convention, the Eichmann
court described Article VI, in line with Nersessian’s proposition, as
establishing only “a compulsory minimum” as regards to jurisdiction “which
19

STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42–43 (3d ed. 2009).
20
1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
21
See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392, 424 (Nov. 26).
22
See NERSESSIAN, supra note 12, at 128–29.
23
See Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide
Convention’s Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2277 (1997).
24
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 84, 411–16.
25
See Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. VI.
26
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 426.
27
See Attorney-Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 303–04 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962)
(emphasis added).

170

171

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

did not affect the existing jurisdiction of States under customary international
law.” 28 As Schabas notes, the Eichmann court’s “audacious proclamation of a
customary norm has gone relatively unchallenged,” and “[a]uthority continues
to grow in support of the proposition that . . . States may exercise universal
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide.” 29 This transition from territorial to
universal jurisdiction suggests that, where the Genocide Convention contains
deficiencies, customary law is capable not only of filling in the gaps but also of
exerting overriding legal force.
Recognizing that a discrepancy between the provisions of the Genocide
Convention and customary law is more than an academic exercise is vital,
since the consequences of applying deficient conventional law could hamper
the prosecution of perpetrators of genocide. If in fact customary law suggests
a broader interpretation of the scope of protected groups, strict application of
the Genocide Convention without regard to customary law will result in the
failure to prosecute the crime. Schabas argues that the “so-called lacunae” of
the Genocide Convention have been filled by the law on crimes against
humanity, 30 which covers a non-exhaustive list of groups. 31 On the other
hand, Caroline Fournet argues that, since crimes against humanity and
genocide are “two distinct legal qualifications,” classifying a case of genocide
as a crime against humanity “is simply an aberration and an absurdity.” 32
Certainly, the label of genocide is more shocking and attaches a greater
stigma, 33 if only by virtue of its association with the atrocities of the Jewish
Holocaust. If in fact a crime constitutes genocide under “moral law,” it would
be inadequate to label it as a lesser crime. The legal application of the
prohibition of genocide would fall short of fulfilling its objective. Chalk
points out that the exclusion of political and social groups from the Genocide
Convention ignores millions of deaths that would otherwise count as deaths by
genocide. 34
28

See id., 36 I.L.R. 5, 11 (Summary) (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 429.
30
See id. at 119.
31
See generally United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15–17, 1998, Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (Jul. 17, 1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
32
See CAROLINE FOURNET, THE CRIME OF DESTRUCTION AND THE LAW OF GENOCIDE 50
(2007).
33
See, e.g,. Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. Secretary General,
¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 31, 2005) (“The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been
pursued and implemented … should not be taken in any way as detracting from the gravity of
the crimes perpetrated.”) [hereinafter Darfur Report]; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, SubComm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Revised and Updated Report
on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985) (by B. Whitaker) (“Genocide is the ultimate crime and the
gravest violation of human rights it is possible to commit”) [hereinafter Whitaker Report].
34
See Frank Chalk, Redefining Genocide, in GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL
DIMENSIONS 50 (G.J. Andreopoulos ed., 1997) (“ignor[es] 15 to 20 million Soviet civilians
29
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C. Protected Groups Are Not Adequately Defined
Another reason to re-investigate customary law is to find clarity. The
Genocide Convention’s list of protected groups, although restrictive, contains
vague terms without supplementary criteria. Antonio Cassese criticizes the
Convention’s lack of criteria for protected groups as a “serious” omission. 35
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) stated that “the
concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups have been researched
extensively and that, at present, there are no generally and internationally
accepted precise definitions thereof.” 36 Likewise, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated that “to attempt to define a
national, ethnical or racial group today using objective and scientifically
irreproachable criteria would be a perilous exercise” and, accordingly,
suggested that targeted groups be categorized based on the specific context of
each case. 37 As the categories of protected groups are “social constructs, not
scientific expressions,” 38 enumerated in the Convention, unaccompanied by
suggested definitions, customary law is needed to clarify the scope of protected
groups.
D. The Sources of Customary International Law
The two elements of customary international law are state practice and
opinio juris sive necessitatis 39 or opinio juris, the “recognition that a rule of
law or legal obligation is involved.” 40 Pursuant to article V of the Genocide
Convention, a clear majority of states adopted the “racial, ethnic, religious, and
national” formula verbatim or merely inserted a reference to article II of the
Convention. 41 Still, state practice does not constitute customary law without
liquidated . . . between 1920 and 1939; . . . roughly 300,000 mentally impaired and mentally ill
Germans and others murdered by the Nazis; . . . thousands of homosexuals killed by the Nazis
because of their sexual orientation; . . . [and a] million or more Khmer murdered by the state
and the Communist party of Kampuchea . . . from 1975 to 1978.”).
35
See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 739
(Malcolm Evans ed., 2006).
36
See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 55
(Dec. 6, 1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 161 (Jan. 27, 2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Musema/judgement/000127.pdf.
37
See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jeltj991214e.pdf.
38
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 129.
39
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
332 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
40
See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 4, ¶
74 (Feb. 20).
41
See NERSESSIAN, supra note 12, at 112–13.
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evidence of opinio juris. The ICJ noted that instances of state compliance with
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Continental Shelf exhibited “acting . . . in
the application of the Convention” without demonstrating a recognition of
being bound by a rule of law. This could not be taken to infer “a new rule of
customary international law.” 42 Similarly, the copy-and-pasting of the four
protected groups of the Genocide Convention into domestic code does not
necessarily demonstrate recognition of having to limit the enumeration to those
groups under a rule of law.
As Mansell explains, detecting opinio juris is first and foremost
complicated by the inherent difficulty of deriving a “mental element” from a
“non-sentient legal personality.” 43 Examples of state practice required to
evidence opinio juris include: “official government statements, diplomatic
exchanges between governments, the opinions of national legal advisers,
national legislation, bilateral treaties, decisions of national courts, and possibly
also voting patterns of a state in an international organisation.” 44
Therefore, a most useful source providing evidence of customary law
consists of legislative and judicial work at the international level. Nersessian
notes, for example, that state participation in “multilateral drafting conventions
can evidence customary international law.” 45 The drafting of the Genocide
Convention in particular provides useful evidence of state practice as it was
adopted by the General Assembly, an international body composed of
representatives from every United Nations member State. The ICTY has listed
the following sources as guides for interpreting the crime of genocide in
international law: the Genocide Convention; “the object and purpose of the
Convention as reflected in the travaux préparatoires;” case law from domestic
adjudication and international ad hoc tribunals; the publications of
international authorities; the preparatory work of the Report of the
International Law Commission on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace
and Security of Mankind; and the preparatory work of the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court. 46
PROTECTED GROUPS AND UNDERLYING CHARACTERISTICS

III.

If customary legal practice is to enlarge the scope of protected groups
provided by the Genocide Convention, it must select groups whose addition
would be in line with the object and purpose of the Convention. Thus, these
42
43

See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 40, ¶ 74.
See WADE MANSELL, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (Univ. of London External Press

2006).
44

See id.
See NERSESSIAN, supra note 12, at 98.
46
See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 501 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/staktj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 541 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krstj010802e.pdf.
45
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new groups would have to be characteristically similar to the four groups—
national, ethnic, racial and religious—listed. 47 According to the ICJ, “[t]he
drafters of the Convention also gave close attention to the positive
identification of groups with specific distinguishing characteristics in deciding
which groups they would include and which . . . they would exclude.” 48
Schabas’s “four-corner” depiction posits that the drafters of the Genocide
Convention “viewed the four groups in a dynamic and synergistic relationship”
and that the “search for autonomous meanings” is therefore impractical. 49
Similarly, the ICTY notes that “the preparatory work of the [Genocide]
Convention shows that setting out such a list was designed more to describe a
single phenomenon.” 50 While Schabas advances his theory in opposition to an
expansive interpretation of the scope of protected groups, he at least signifies
that the four groups are united by underlying characteristics that would have to
comprise additional protected groups for the object and purpose of the
Genocide Convention to be preserved.
A. Keeping the Crime of Genocide Prestigious
The interest in maintaining the prestige of the crime of genocide is an
ongoing force that limits the scope of protected groups. The fact alone that the
General Assembly’s interpretation of groups protected under international law
transformed in only two-years’ time from a non-exhaustive list in Resolution
96(I) to the exhaustive four-group list of the Genocide Convention is telling. 51
The ICTY prosecutor, Mr. Eric Ostberg, in his opening statement asserted that,
“in the interests of international justice, genocide should not be diluted or
belittled by too broad an interpretation” and that a strict interpretation is
needed to “justify the appellation of genocide as the ‘ultimate crime.’” 52 The
travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention and subsequent sources of
custom reflect an ongoing vigilance in limiting the scope of protected groups
as a means of avoiding too broad an interpretation of genocide under
international law.

47

See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 511–16 (Sep. 2,
1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf (using
the same sequence of logic to find that the Tutsi constituted a protected group under the
Genocide Convention); See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 150.
48
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 194 (Feb. 26).
49
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 129–31.
50
See Prosecutor v. Krstić, supra note 46, ¶¶ 555–56.
51
See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (Oct. 15,
1948) (discussing the inclusion of “political” grounds in the General Assembly resolution).
52
See Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, Case No. IT-95-18-I, Transcript of Hearing,
Opening Statement of Eric Ostberg, Prosecutor of the ICTY at 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jun. 27, 1996),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/960627it.htm.
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Exclusion of Groups from the Genocide Convention

Most fundamentally, the Genocide Convention and the travaux
préparatoires strongly suggest that, contrary to Van Schaack’s proposition that
the Convention merely sets a “basic minimum,” 53 the enumeration of protected
groups was intended to be exhaustive. Article II sets both the minimum and
the maximum scope of protected groups. The extensive discussion over
potential protected groups and their subsequent exclusion 54 in the course of
drafting suggests caution and selectivity in developing the list. Schabas points
out that “there is no question the drafters intended to list the protected groups
in an exhaustive fashion” 55 and that the Convention “does not even invite
application to what might be called analogous groups.” 56
As to the exclusiveness of the enumeration of protected groups, the
debate over including political groups illustrates the general effort to keep the
list narrowed to only those groups indisputably protected under international
law. The inclusion of political groups—a type of group the General Assembly
had listed in Resolution 96 (I)—sparked considerable debate among the
drafters of the Genocide Convention. Ultimately, after at first deciding to
retain political groups 57 and then reopening the debate, 58 the committee erased
political groups from the enumeration. Adam Jones notes that the inclusion of
political groups was ruled out even in “the twilight of the Stalinist era” when
“it was clear that political groups would play a prominent if not dominant role
as targets for destruction.” 59 Indeed, the travaux préparatoires show that
delegates were well aware of the historical and impending justifications for
addressing the protection of political groups from genocide. 60 Although it has
been suggested that the exclusion of political groups was based on efforts by
the Soviet Union in the drafting stages to “put Soviet practices beyond the
realm of inquiry,” 61 the travaux préparatoires suggest that the Soviet Union
was only one of several opposing States 62 in a debate that was concerned
predominantly with legitimate practical issues. Schabas ruled out the
53

See Van Schaack, supra note 23, at 2277.
See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg., supra note 51, at 115.
55
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 151.
56
See id. at 117.
57
See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg., supra note 51, at 115.
58
See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 128th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.128 (Nov. 29,
1948).
59
See ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE 11 (2006).
60
See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg., supra note 51, at 114 (“The
historical examples which had been given showed that the political group really stood in need
of protection, for political hatred was now tending to replace religious hatred.”).
61
See NERSESSIAN, supra note 12, at 106.
62
See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 160 (“The Soviet views were shared by a number of
other States for whom it is difficult to establish any geographic or social common
denominator: Lebanon, Sweden, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, the Philippines, the Dominican
Republic, Iran, Egypt, Belgium, and Uruguay.”).
54
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possibility, arguing that there is insufficient evidence for the theory that the
committee’s exclusion of political groups stemmed from Soviet ulterior
motives. 63 For this particular discussion, it is noteworthy that the committee
voted unmistakably in favor (29 to 13, with 9 abstentions) 64 of excluding
political groups, even faced with the reality that political groups constituted an
especially vulnerable group.
In further support of the exclusiveness of protected groups, the drafters
excluded a number of other groups that had at some point been brought to the
table for consideration. These included ideological, 65 linguistic, 66 and
economic groups. 67 Overall, the drafters tried to avoid groups whose inclusion
would be unnecessary or impractical, favoring instead the tightest enumeration
possible. 68 As a whole, the travaux préparatoires demonstrate a dominant
interest in setting a scope of protected groups in the Convention defined by
only those groups unquestionably and most widely accepted by the
international community as protected under international law.
2. Subsequent Refusal to Include Additional Groups
Political and other groups have re-entered the debate on protected
groups in the drafting of international documents and faced the same result as
in the drafting of the Genocide Convention. The International Law
Commission (ILC), in developing the Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, entertained a non-exhaustive list of protected
groups, 69 but eventually decided on the original four-group exhaustive list for
63

See id.
See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg., supra note 51, at 115.
65
See Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Comments of Governments on the Draft
Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/477), U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N.
Doc. E/623/Add.4, reproduced in 1 HIRAD ABTAHI & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION 639–40 (2008); See also U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 74th mtg. at 98,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.16-140 (1948).
66
See U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, § 2, art. 1,
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/447 (Jun. 26, 1947) [hereinafter Draft Convention] ;
U.N. Secretary-General, Report and the Draft Convention of the General Secretariat, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.10/41 (Jun. 26, 1947); Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide,U.N. GAOR,
6th Comm., 2d Sess., appendix II, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/362 (Aug. 25, 1947); U.N. GAOR, 6th
Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg., supra note 51, at 115.
67
See United States of America: Amendments to the draft Convention for the prevention
and punishment of the crime of genocide (E/794), U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess.,U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/214 (Oct. 4, 1948); U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 74th mtg. at 100, 103, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR.74 (Oct. 14, 1948).
68
See, e.g., U.N. ECOSOC, Report of the Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, 4th mtg. at 11–
12, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4 (Apr. 15, 1948) (“Mr. LIN (China) suggested the inclusion of . . .
political groups . . . , but warned against making the definition needlessly lengthy. There was,
in fact no good reason why social, economic and other groups should not be included, or even
why no mention of sex distinction should be made, because there again it was possible to
envisage separate groups.”).
69
For example, see Rep. of the Comm’n to the General Assembly of Its Forty-First
Session, , 41st Sess., May 2–July 21, 1989, ¶ 160, [1989] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc.
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the same reason underlying the removal of political groups from the final
enumeration in the Genocide Convention. In its forty-third session, the
Commission decided “in favour of [an exhaustive enumeration] . . . in view of .
. . the need not to stray too far from a text widely accepted by the international
community.” 70 In its forty-sixth session, the Commission, in exploring the
crimes which would constitute the subject-matter jurisdiction of an
international criminal court, stated that genocide was “[t]he least problematic”
to define, as it had been clearly and “authoritatively defined in the [Genocide
Convention], . . . which envisages that cases of genocide may be referred to an
international criminal court.” 71 The latest version of the Draft Code in 1996
reaffirms the exhaustive, four-group enumeration of protected groups in the
Genocide Convention. 72 The drafters of the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court gave consideration to the protection of social, political, and
cultural groups, 73 but ultimately settled on the Convention’s four-group
enumeration. 74 Plessis states that “[i]n respect of the Rome Statute, the
drafters have evinced a clear intention to limit the groups to the four identified
by the Genocide Convention.” 75
In Jelisić, the Trial Chamber at the ICTY boldly asserted that a
perpetrated group may be defined by negative criteria. 76 As the court
explained, such an approach would “consist of identifying individuals as not
being part of the group to which the perpetrators . . . belong and which to them
displays specific national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.” 77 This
approach would have had a drastic impact on the application of article II had it
A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.l (Part 2) (1989) (“[The] draft provision on genocide [submitted by
the Special Rapporteur was] favourably received by members of the Commission . . . [because]
. . . unlike that in the 1948 Convention, the enumeration of acts constituting the crime of
genocide proposed by the Special Rapporteur was not exhaustive.”).
70
See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 43rd Sess., April 29–July 19, 1991, art. 19, cmt, §2,
[1991] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 102, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.l (Part 2) (1991).
71
See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 46th Sess., May 2–July 22, 1994, 37, [1994] 2 Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n 38, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2) (1994).
72
See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 48th Sess., May 6–July 26, 1996, art. 17, [1996] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2) (1996) [hereinafter
ILC 48th Session].
73
See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
the International Criminal Court, Rome, It., Text of the Draft Statute for the International
Criminal Court, 2 UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/CRP.8 (Mar.–Apr. 1988) (“The Preparatory
Committee took note of the suggestion to examine the possibility fo addressing ‘social and
political’ groups in the context of crimes against humanity.”); Plessis, supra note 11, at 39
(“The idea of including a ‘cultural group’ in the ICC Statute was rejected at the Rome
Conference.”).
74
See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15–17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 13, n.2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998).
75
See Plessis, supra note 11, at 39.
76
See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 71 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999).
77
Id.
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been subsequently supported, since it implied a very loose and expansive
interpretation of the Genocide Convention’s protected groups.
The
requirement to simply display national, ethnic, racial or religious
characteristics sets a much lower standard for protected groups than does being
a single national, ethnic, racial or religious group as article II requires.
Predictably, the Tribunal later rejected this approach in Stakić, contending that
“it is not appropriate to define the group in general terms, as, for example,
‘non-Serbs.’” 78
B. Recognizing the Great Loss to Mankind Caused by Group
Extermination
Since the inception of the legal codification of genocide, its prestige
has been supported by the idea that genocide involves not only the loss of
many individual lives but, more importantly, of the broader entity
encompassing those individuals, the loss of which significantly detracts from
the human race as a whole. Raphael Lemkin in his landmark Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe conceives of genocide as the act of destroying “essential
elements of the world community.” 79 He argues that “[t]he destruction of a
nation . . . results in the loss of its future contributions to the world,” consisting
of “genuine traditions” and “genuine culture.” 80 A. Dirk Moses, reflecting on
19th century Polish romantic nationalism, writes that protecting national,
racial, religious, and ethnic groups under genocide law is based on the idea that
“nations and nationhood are intrinsically valuable because, unlike human
collectivities such as political parties, they produce culture, endow individual
life with meaning, and comprise the building blocks of human civilization.” 81
This concept is reflected in Resolution 96 (I), which declares that genocide
“results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other
contributions represented by these human groups.” 82 Also, the Genocide
Convention preamble recognizes that “genocide has inflicted great losses on
humanity.” 83
The class of people that was originally associated with this concept of
cultural loss was minority groups, the “principal beneficiaries of genocide
law.” 84 According to the ICTY, the list of protected groups in the Genocide
Convention “was designed . . . to describe a single phenomenon, roughly

See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 31, 2003).
79
See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 91 (1944).
80
Id.
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See A. Dirk Moses, Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENOCIDE STUDIES 19, 23 (Donald Bloxham & A. Dirk Moses eds.,
2010).
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See G.A. Res. 96 (I), supra note 4.
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corresponding to . . . ‘national minorities.’” 85 Protection of national minorities
as a means of protecting the diversity of mankind has been supported by
customary international human rights law. 86 The 1954 Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, to which
123 States are party, 87 states in its preamble that “damage to the cultural
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural
heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture
of the world.” 88 Article I of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization Declaration of the Principles of Cultural Co-operation
recognizes that “each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected
and preserved.” 89 Furthermore, the ICTY suggested in Krstić that “those who
devise and implement genocide seek to deprive humanity of the manifold
richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions provide.” 90 In Stakić
the Appeals Chamber shared Lemkin’s sentiment that “the world loses ‘future
contributions’” 91 when the crime of genocide is executed.
This standard for protected groups was also alluded to in the drafting of
the Genocide Convention. The Polish delegation of the Sixth Committee
argued that while racial, religious and national groups needed protection for
the sake of upholding equality, political groups “were often the most
destructive elements of the community, as in the case of the [N]azi and fascist
parties” and that “[i]t was debatable, therefore, whether political groups should
enjoy the same rights as other groups.” 92 The travaux préparatoires of the
Genocide Convention therefore indicate that the drafters were mindful of the
intention to include only those groups whose loss would have a negative
impact, and that this requirement may have been fatal to the inclusion of
political groups.
The implication that genocide detracts from mankind is a decisive
element in determining the proper scope of protected groups. The concept is
See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 556 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001),
86
See generally Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: Ensuring Each Group’s
Contribution to Humanity, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 17 (2011) (recounting the development of
international law for the protection of minorities, which “fuelled the recognition of the crimes
of persecution and genocide”).
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See UNESCO, Legal Instruments, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention,
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
88
See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
pmbl., May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
89
See UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of Cultural Co-operation, art. I, UNESCO
Doc. 14C/Resolutions, Nov. 1966 (emphasis added).
90
See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krsaj040419e.pdf.
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See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 21 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf
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See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 75th mtg., supra note 51, at 111.
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found at the origin of genocide law and is supported in genocide adjudication
as well as human rights law protecting national minorities. It is also an
essential component of genocide conceptually, because it supplies the term
with its inherently negative connotation. Without it, genocide would be a
neutral term, meaning that protected groups would not be ascertained
according to their value but merely according to their “distinguishability.” The
groups protected under genocide law must be valuable enough to the human
race that their extermination would constitute the most devastating
international crime.
C. Including Only Permanent and Stable Groups
Permanence and stability are qualities that have clearly guided the
determination of protected groups in the drafting stages of the Genocide
Convention and beyond. As explained above, lack of permanence and stability
was a primary reason for excluding political groups from the Convention’s list
of protected groups. The travaux préparatoires show that the nature of
political groups was judged against the background of the included groups,
which were considered to be more permanent and stable since membership was
less voluntary. The Lebanese delegation of the Ad Hoc Committee made the
distinction between the “inalienable character” of racial, national, and religious
groups and the “far less stable” character of political groups. 93 The Polish
delegation pointed out that “[a] racial, national or religious group did not
disappear simply because its head was eliminated or as a result of reprisals
against its leaders.” 94 In the Sixth Committee, the Iranian delegation similarly
expressed opposition to retaining political groups because of their lack of
“permanence” relative to racial, religious, and national groups:
If it were recognized that there was a distinction between those
groups, membership of which was inevitable . . . [and] whose
distinctive features were permanent; and those, membership of
which was voluntary, such as political groups, whose distinctive
features were not permanent, it must be admitted that the
destruction of the first type appeared most heinous in the light
of the conscience of humanity, since it was directed against
human beings whom chance alone had grouped together . . . .
Although it was true that people could change their nationality
or their religion, such changes did not in fact happen very
often. 95
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See U.N. ECOSOC, Report of the Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, 4th mtg., supra note
68, at 10.
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See id.
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U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 74th mtg., supra note 67, at 99.
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The Ecuadorian delegation, although in favor of including political groups,
admitted that the political group was “of course less stable in its characteristics
than the others [and] could be joined and left at will.” 96 Again, in determining
whether to include political groups, the Polish delegation argued that “[t]hose
who needed protection most were those who could not alter their status.” 97
The International Law Commission later concluded that the drafters of the
Genocide Convention had excluded political groups because they were “not
considered to be sufficiently stable for the purposes of the [crime of
genocide].” 98 Whether political groups were excluded for reasons of principle,
as discussed here, or in light of prudential considerations, permanence and
stability were unquestionably important factors weighing on the minds of both
those opposing and those favoring the inclusion of political groups.
The ICTR acknowledged the intention of the Genocide Convention
drafters to include only permanent and stable groups and used it as a guide. 99
While Akayesu’s final determination, which seemed to justify the inclusion of
any permanent and stable group in the scope of protected groups, was bold and
controversial, 100 it reinforced the importance of respecting the object and
purpose of the Convention and brought attention to the importance of the
permanence and stability characteristics. The shortfall of the decision was in
capturing only part of the object and purpose of the Convention, as it did not
acknowledge that the drafters clearly intended to keep the list of protected
groups exhaustive.
STATUS OF UNPROTECTED GROUPS UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW

IV.

In the pursuit to find groups protected from genocide in customary
international law that are not covered in the Genocide Convention, it is
immediately a bad sign that the Convention’s precise enumeration has been
reproduced verbatim in subsequent—also recent—authoritative sources of
international law. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) 101 and the Statute of the ICTR 102 stipulate that genocide is committed on
a “national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.” On the other hand,
domestic legislation and the Akayesu interpretation of the Genocide
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Convention suggest that the exhaustiveness of this enumeration is not
universally accepted. 103
A. All Groups (Non-Exhaustive Formulations)
The domestic codes of Romania and France have broadened the scope
of protected groups to cover potentially any group. The French code stipulates
that genocide can be perpetrated against “[a] particular group, apart from other
arbitrary criteria.” 104 Similarly, the Romanian code includes “community”
under the protected groups. 105 As the first part of this article establishes, the
drafters of the Convention intended for the list of protected groups to be both
exhaustive and exclusive. The criteria for determining these groups form a
high standard that the Romanian and French codes, by stipulating nonexhaustive and all-inclusive lists of protected groups, disregard. One might
characterize France as a persistent objector to the Convention’s scope of
protected groups, considering that the French delegation pushed for a more
expansive list of protected groups in the drafting stages. 106 Still, by failing to
embody the fundamental characteristics of the Convention’s protected groups,
the French code’s list of protected groups goes against the object and purpose
of the Convention, which is forbidden under customary international law for
States party to an international treaty. 107 As support for a rule of customary
law departing from the Convention, the non-exhaustive formulation is too rare
in state practice and arguably a breach of treaty obligations by those states
party to the Convention that use it.
The Akayesu decision at the ICTR suggested that genocide can be
perpetrated against any permanent and stable group. 108 This interpretation is
stricter than that of France and Romania, as it applies one of the three
fundamental characteristics of the Genocide Convention’s enumeration. Also,
the interpretation was made in an effort to fit the Tutsi within the definition of
an existing protected group (ethnic), 109 not to unearth a brand new protected
group.
The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Darfur
Commission) recognized this, stating that “this expansive interpretation does
not substantially depart from the text of the Genocide Convention and the
103
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corresponding customary rules, because it too hinges on four categories of
groups [national, ethnic, racial, or religious].” 110 Still, general application of
this interpretation is in danger of justifying the addition of new protected
groups. It is therefore not in accordance with the General Assembly’s
intention to maintain an exhaustive and exclusive list. The Darfur Commission
argued that the Tribunal was “obliged” to apply “an innovative interpretation”
as a result of “the limitations of current international rules on genocide.” 111
Boldly, the Commission stated that the interpretation has not been matched
with state opposition and concluded “that interpretation and expansion has
become part and parcel of international customary law.” 112 A more realistic
conclusion would have added: “[I]nsomuch as its application does not depart
from the four-group enumeration of the Genocide Convention.” As Schabas
suggests, the expansive application of the Convention is probably a product of
frustration resulting from the difficulty in fitting the perpetrated group neatly in
one of the Convention’s four categories. 113 Indeed, the ethnic distinction
between the Tutsi and the Hutu in Rwanda at the time of the Rwandan
Genocide was not entirely clear. 114 Fournet writes that the Tutsis and Hutus
“shared the same language, and probably the same culture” and were not
separate ethnic entities. 115 The game-changer for genocide adjudication at the
Tribunal was the distribution of identity cards that evidenced a “permanent
distinction” between ethnic groups in Rwanda and guided the Hutus in their
pursuit of genocide. 116
In sum, a non-exhaustive application of the Genocide Convention’s
protected groups is not substantially supported in customary international law.
Since it goes against the basic intentions of the Convention’s drafters, it is
unlikely that such a formulation has a future in international law. Since courts
would have to challenge the object and purpose of the Convention to
implement such a formulation, supporting state practice is unlikely to reach a
level sufficient to create a new rule of customary law. The interpretation of the
ICTR that affords permanent and stable groups protection is more in line with
the Convention’s object and purpose, but only insomuch as it is applied in
protecting existing groups (national, ethnic, racial, or religious). Noteworthy is
the fact that, despite its expansive application, the Tribunal demonstrated
opinio juris with regard to the Convention’s enumeration. Instead of
attempting to sidestep or outright refute the Convention, the Tribunal cleverly
interpreted the Convention to render a decision that, though progressive, at
least claimed to be in accordance with the object and purpose of the
Convention.
110
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B. Political Groups
Despite their exclusion from the Genocide Convention, political groups
have found explicit protection in several domestic codes prohibiting
genocide. 117 While these states represent a clear minority, as most states have
excluded political groups, 118 the states demonstrate that the protection of
political groups under genocide law is not a dead concept. Nersessian further
notes that “no state has objected to the broader formulations,” although there is
no evidence of opinio juris; the inclusion of political groups in these instances
demonstrates nothing more than utilizing an optional feature of domestic
law. 119 As Nersessian concedes, the survival of political groups in domestic
protection is at best an “emergent” norm of customary international law. 120
The travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention demonstrate
that political groups lacked wide international support from the beginning of
codification of genocide law. Delegations such as those from Egypt, Iran,
Uruguay, and the United States feared the inclusion of political groups among
the protected groups would result in a lower number of ratifications and
therefore a less forceful convention. 121 While much of the discussion
surrounding the inclusion of political groups was over the appropriateness of
including political groups among more permanent and stable protected groups,
the committee was certainly mindful of the practical consequences of including
these groups. The United States delegation explicitly distinguished between
drafting a “convention founded on just principles” and one “ratified by the
greatest possible number of Governments” 122 and suggested that both interests
should be reconciled.
It might be argued that, because political considerations played a
significant role 123 in excluding political groups, the Convention does not
necessarily convey the truest definition of genocide. The meaning of genocide
under “moral law” is not compromised by political considerations. Nersessian
writes that, “[I]t is fair to characterize the exclusion of political groups as a
negotiated political compromise[,] impact[ing] the legal significance of the
exclusion.” 124 Ironically, the political compromise affecting the enumeration
of protected groups makes the Genocide Convention a more legally significant
document. Thus, customary law does not necessarily reflect moral law. The
117
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greatest concern for the drafters was developing a document that would most
accurately reflect customary law and thereby have effective international legal
application. The practical considerations leading to the exclusion of political
groups suggested in the travaux préparatoires reflect proactive efforts to align
the Convention with customary law. Maximal ratification is indicative of
greater international acceptance and therefore provides stronger evidence of
customary law.
1. Bangladesh
Nersessian surveys domestic case law for evidence of customary law
supporting the protection of political groups. He first looks at the 1970s
conflict between East and West Pakistan that led to the establishment of
Bangladesh, since Bangladesh intended to prosecute captured West Pakistanis
on genocide charges under genocide law that covered political groups. 125 The
Bengalis, situated in East Pakistan, were “ethnically, linguistically, and
culturally distinct” from West Pakistan, and East Pakistan deployed its military
to suppress a potential secession. This is not what Nersessian is saying. He
said 195 POWs were not released because of genocide charges. 126 After
conflict that resulted in approximately three million killings, 127 India
intervened and captured 93,000 Pakistani soldiers, 195 of whom were to be
prosecuted on genocide charges. 128 Nersessian points out that India was
willing to extradite the Pakistani soldiers to Bangladesh, perhaps “reflect[ing]
tacit support by India of the decision to include political groups as a
category.” 129 This is a stretch of the imagination, however, considering that
the protection of political groups under genocide was not central— perhaps
irrelevant—to the situation at hand. Although Nersessian suggests that “one
might speculate” that the conflict was “motivated by political retribution,” 130
the conflict was primarily a result of efforts by West Pakistan to suppress the
Hindi minority, which was concentrated in East Pakistan. 131 Nersessian’s brief
consideration of this conflict in the context of protection of political groups
nevertheless brings to light the possibility that a political group may find
indirect protection under the Genocide Convention, not “as such” but insofar
as it overlaps with the type of protected group that is being perpetrated.
125
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2. Spain
Spanish genocide adjudication suggests a trend toward maintaining the
scope of protected groups in the Genocide Convention. In two 1998 cases
concerning crimes committed in Argentina and Chile in the 1970s and 1980s,
the Criminal Division of the Spanish National Appellate Court considered a
broad interpretation of the Genocide Convention before coming to the
conclusion that both series of crimes constituted genocide. 132 In the
Argentinean case, the defendants had argued that the repression had been
politically motivated, and could therefore not constitute genocide as defined by
the Genocide Convention. 133 The court acknowledged that the Convention did
not include political groups, but reasoned nevertheless that “el silencio”
(silence or omission, in this case) does not necessarily imply exclusion.
Nersessian points out that the court’s holding demonstrated opinio juris
regarding political genocide since it applied international law. 134 The court’s
reasoning, however, goes against the object and purpose of the Genocide
Convention, since the drafters proactively excluded groups, including political
groups, from the enumeration. The court stated that, regardless of the drafters’
intentions, the “Convention gains life through the successive signatures and
ratifications of the treaty,” mistakenly assuming that ratifying countries have
the option of pushing the boundaries established by the Convention. Any
departures, as with treaty reservations, from the Convention must not stray
from its object and purpose. 135 Nersessian concedes that “[n]o other state has
approved of the methodology underlying the case of the result in the
decision.” 136 The Spanish Supreme Court in 2007 revisited the Argentina case
and recognized that the drafters had purposely excluded political groups from
protection. 137 It decided that the events under question constituted crimes
against humanity, but not genocide. 138
3. Inter-American Court of Human Rights
In Diaz v. Colombia, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, a
regional human rights protection mechanism for the Organization of American
States (OAS), dealt squarely with the protection of political groups under
132
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international law on genocide. 139 Petitioners alleged that the Colombian
government had committed genocide by trying to eliminate the Patriotic
Union, a political party. 140 They asked the court to consider the definition of
genocide under customary international law. The court stated that the
Genocide Convention “codifies customary international law” 141 and that it
“explicitly excluded” political groups from protection. 142 Significantly, the
court decided that the conflict under question did not fit “within the current
definition of genocide provided by international law,” even though the facts
“might be understood in common parlance to constitute genocide.” 143 Without
frustration, the court acknowledged that international law as it stands may not
cover all instances of genocide. Thus, instead of exercising judicial creativity
and attempting to force the protection of political groups into customary law,
the court applied international law realistically and appropriately.
4.

Other Domestic Trials

Nersessian brings up a few more national genocide cases that support
the protection of political groups, but as Nersessian acknowledges, closer
analysis of these cases reveals questionable and unconvincing jurisprudence. 144
For example, a 1979 court in Equatorial Guinea tried Francisco Macias for
“offences against political opponents and others” and found him guilty of
genocide. 145 Issues such as applicable law, lack of the requisite mens rea, and
“procedural irregularities” rendered the case illegitimate support for the
protection of political groups. 146 Also, a Romanian court found Nicolae and
Elena Ceausescu guilty of genocide “clearly driven by political ideology.” 147
The genocide law applied included collectivities among protected groups. 148
Still, Nersessian notes a “rush to judgment” that brings into question the
fairness of the trial. 149 As with the genocide trial in Equatorial Guinea,
Nersessian concludes that the Romanian trial did not constitute legitimate state
practice. 150
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5. Conclusion
In all, state (and regional) practice on genocide prosecution is
insufficient to support the protection of political groups under customary
international law. According to the ICJ, “State practice . . . should have been
both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; and
should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition
that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.” 151 State practice for the
protection of political groups from genocide hardly approaches this standard.
It is curious that the protection of political groups, which continues to be
rejected under international law, was included in General Assembly Resolution
96 (I), one of the original and most authoritative sources on genocide law.
Schabas attributes this to “superficial” and “preliminary” discussion during the
drafting of the resolution. 152 Nersessian comments that the reason for adding
political groups in the drafting of the resolution is unknown, and that the
committee’s report contains no discussion on the matter. 153 It is especially
curious since Lemkin originally defined genocide as the destruction of “a
nation or of an ethnic group” 154 and purposely left out political groups, as later
confirmed by his opposition to their inclusion during the drafting of the
Convention. 155
C. Social and Economic Groups (Cambodia)
Crimes in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979 156
were perpetrated on a massive scale against what have been labeled political,
social, and economic groups, 157 all of which were intentionally excluded from
the Genocide Convention’s protection. Hurst Hannum describes the Khmer
Rouge campaign as a “radical transformation” involving “racial, social,
ideological, and political purification of the Cambodian nation.” 158 Some of
the crimes may fall neatly under the Convention, as there is evidence that the
Khmer Rouge targeted Muslim Chams, indigenous Vietnamese, Buddhist
monks, and other minority groups, but “the vast majority of killings took place
151
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on political and social grounds.” 159 A national court found Pol Pot and Ieng
Sary guilty of genocide in 1979, but as legitimate State practice this judgment
has been disregarded. 160 Decree Law No. 1, which states in the preamble that
“the Pol-Pot-Ieng Sary clique have . . . forced the entire Kampuchean people to
live in genocidal conditions,” presumes that genocide occurred even before
actual adjudication. 161 Moreover, Nersessian notes that the definition of
genocide applied in the case “bore little resemblance to the Convention.” 162
The impending trials at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (Extraordinary Chambers), a tribunal established by an agreement
between the state of Cambodia and the United Nations, 163 may provide an
updated status of the protection of social and economic groups from genocide
under international law. In regards to the applicable law, Cambodia attempted
to enlarge the scope of protected groups to include those defined by “wealth,
level of education, sociological environment (urban/rural), allegiance to a
political system or regime (old/new people), social class or social category
(merchant, civil servant, etc.),” 164 evidently conforming the crime of genocide
to address the Khmer Rouge atrocities. The United Nations rejected this
proposal in favor of article II of the Genocide Convention. 165 The Group of
Experts for Cambodia briefly visited the topic of genocide, 166 but ultimately
left the determination up to the Extraordinary Chambers. 167 The Law on the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers stipulates that the tribunal shall
interpret genocide as it is defined in the Genocide Convention, and repeats the
four-group formulation of article II of the Convention. 168 Beyond identifying
the extermination of the aforementioned ethnic and religious groups as
genocide, the Extraordinary Chambers will probably have to depart from the
159
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Convention to label the Khmer Rouge atrocities genocide. There appear to be
two possible routes. One option is to classify the Khmers as a national group,
and find that the Khmer Rouge committed “auto-genocide” 169 with intent to
destroy, “in part,” the Khmers as a national group. Quigley took this route to
support his determination of genocide in Cambodia. 170 The other route is to
outright expand the Genocide Convention to include the protection of social,
economic, and/or political groups. As the Extraordinary Chambers form a
hybrid tribunal under the auspices of the United Nations, any significant
departure from the Genocide Convention seems unlikely. Had Jelisić’s
“negative approach” not been subsequently defeated in Stakić, 171 this would
have been the most applicable and sensible approach considering that the
Khmer Rouge targeted “the other” 172 more so than any one particular national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.
D. Groups Perceived by the Perpetrator
International judicial practice regarding genocide has provided
substantial support for the “subjective approach” in identifying members of a
perpetrated group. The subjective approach, as opposed to the objective
approach, relies on the perception of the perpetrator in determining whether a
protected group was targeted as such. The objective approach judges whether
the perpetrated victims constitute a protected group based solely on objective
criteria. As the International Law Commission (ILC) asserted at its 48th
session, “the intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such,’ meaning as a
separate and distinct entity.” 173 Similarly, the drafters of the Genocide
Convention noted that “[t]he destruction of the human group is the actual aim
in view.” 174
The subjective approach was adopted consistently by the ICTR in
finding the Tutsis to be a distinct ethnic group. Whereas objectively the Hutus
and Tutsis were not perfectly distinguishable, subjectively the Tutsis had been
viewed as distinct. In Bagilishema, the Tribunal held that
[T]he perpetrators of genocide may characterize the targeted
group in ways that do not fully correspond to conceptions of the
group shared generally, or by other segments of society. In such
169
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a case, the Chamber is of the opinion that, on the evidence, if a
victim was perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a
protected group, the victim could be considered by the Chamber
as a member of the protected group, for the purposes of
genocide. 175
This view finds support in a number of other cases at the Tribunal 176 and also
in Jelisić at the ICTY. 177
The implication for the scope of protected groups is potentially
significant, but is ultimately balanced by the simultaneous application of the
objective approach. Schabas notes that under the subjective approach,
genocide could be committed “against a group that does not have any real
objective existence.” 178 Or, hypothetically, genocide could be committed
against a group that is objectively defined as an unprotected group but
somehow viewed by the perpetrator as a protected group. This possibility was
ruled out in Semanza, which asserted that the determination of a group’s
protection under the Genocide Convention should be made using both
objective and subjective criteria. 179 As long as the subjective approach is
complemented with the objective approach and carried out with respect to the
Convention’s enumeration of protected groups, it will have no impact on the
scope of protected groups.
E. Groups with International Human Rights
While customary law concerning the definition of genocide tends to
reinforce the Genocide Convention’s enumeration of protected groups, it may
be the case that general group rights in international human rights law support
the addition of new groups to the enumeration. After all, the four protected
groups each possess rights under international human rights law. For example,
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 18
175
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establishes freedom of religion, and article 27 establishes the right of ethnic
minorities to enjoy their own culture and use their own language. 180 The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination forbids discrimination against racial groups. 181 While the
status under international human rights law of the national groups listed in the
Genocide Convention is less certain, since the definition of these groups is
unclear, 182 the most relevant stipulation is probably that of article 1 of the
ICCPR, which establishes the rights of peoples to “freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development.” 183
1. Political Groups
Nersessian supports his argument for the inclusion of political groups
using this line of reasoning. He cites in international law “the right to hold
opinions,” “freedom of political association and assembly,” “freedom to
express political opinion,” “rights to participate in government,” and “freedom
from unlawful discrimination based on political opinion” established in core
human rights documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ICCPR, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American
Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights. 184 Having established the prevalence of political freedom under
international law, Nersessian argues that genocide “can pervert the actual or
potential exercise of these rights.” 185 In the context of international human
rights law, it appears that Nersessian’s comparison of political groups to the
core-four protected groups of the Genocide Convention is well-supported.
Special Rapporteur Benjamin Whitaker notes that the drafters of the Genocide
Convention that were in favor of including political groups found religious
groups and political groups to be comparable by virtue of being defined by
“common beliefs that unite their members.” 186 What is less compelling about
Nersessian’s argument is the connection between political groups and the
individual political freedoms expressed in international law. He argues that
genocide involves a “two-fold” rights violation, involving the “rights of the
individual and the group’s right to exist ‘as such.’” 187 The key point here is
that the Genocide Convention stipulates that the perpetrator attempts to destroy
180
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a particular type of group “as such.” 188 Indeed, Nersessian concedes that “it is
not important not to overstate the point because it is not the violation of the
individual rights alone that warrants treatment as genocide.” 189
2. The Right to Self-Determination
The right to self-determination, as established in article 1 of the ICCPR,
is clearly a group right under international law that may have implications for
the scope of protected groups in genocide law. Not only is the right to selfdetermination a group right; it is, conceptually, closely related to genocide.
International practice of the right to self-determination demonstrates that its
fundamental purpose is to acknowledge distinct peoples’ right to exist by
giving them an adequate level of autonomy. Genocide seems to have the
opposite result; the attempt to destroy a people is in the pursuit of eliminating
that people from existence. Accordingly, David Lisson calls genocide the
“direct inverse” of self-determination. 190
This inverse relationship leads to the challenge of determining whether
there are any specific groups possessing the right to self-determination that are
not listed in the Genocide Convention. Such a finding would uncover an
inconsistency in international law since—accepting that genocide is the
“inverse” of self-determination—the existence of such a group(s) would make
for the possibility, reductio ad absurdum, wherein the elimination of a group
that possesses the right to self-determination does not constitute genocide.
Lisson advances this argument in support of a broader understanding of
“national” groups that is more in line with the definition of national groups
possessing the right to self-determination. 191 The biggest challenge in
matching the Genocide Convention’s protected groups with groups that
possess the right to self-determination is the fact that the difficulty of defining
“peoples” mentioned in article 1 of the ICCPR is even more problematic than
attempting to define each of the Genocide Convention’s protected groups.
Related convention and customary practice clarify the scope of
“peoples” under article 1 of the ICCPR. Article 73 of the U.N. Charter urges
the development of self-government of “peoples” that “have not yet attained a
full measure of self-government.” 192 General Assembly Resolution 1541
states that article 73 of the Charter “should be applicable to territories . . . of
the colonial type.” 193 The resolution further suggests that article 73 should
188
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apply to peoples that are “distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country
administering.” 194 Customary practice of self-determination reflects the
General Assembly’s 1960 characterization of peoples with a right to selfdetermination. The right has predominantly supported the creation of
independent states for colonial peoples that were ethnically or culturally
distinct from the colonizing state. Beyond this type of situation, the right to
self-determination has demonstrated little applicable value, probably because
the creation of new States threatens the principle of territorial integrity
established in the UN Charter. 195 Indeed, Manfred Nowak comments that the
right’s application is restricted “to peoples under alien subjugation, colonial
domination and exploitation.” 196
In light of the status of the right of self-determination under
international law, it appears that the “inverse” theory of genocide and selfdetermination does not support the addition of any new protected groups to the
Genocide Convention’s enumeration in article II. The peoples possessing the
right to self-determination under customary law already fit within the
enumeration, most likely as ethnic or racial groups. As the exercise of the
right to self-determination has primarily involved the creation of new states, it
is unlikely to have substantial post-colonial application since it is at odds with
the principle of territorial integrity. It is therefore unlikely that any type of
people other than colonized peoples will ever possess the right under
customary law.
3. Indigenous Peoples
The consideration of groups possessing the right to self-determination
makes for a smooth segue into the consideration of indigenous peoples as a
protected group under the Genocide Convention, since the General Assembly
in 2007 declared in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that
indigenous peoples possess both the right of self-determination 197 and the
“collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and
shall not be subjected to any act of genocide.” 198 Indigenous peoples’ right to
self-determination is nascent, as it needs a substantial level of customary
practice to establish the General Assembly’s declaration as a rule of
international law. Nevertheless, the inception of this right for indigenous
people in international convention makes for the prospect that someday the
“inverse” theory may find application for indigenous peoples.
Although the General Assembly explicitly noted indigenous peoples as
a group protected from genocide, the Declaration is a General Assembly
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resolution and is therefore not legally binding. Also, the explicit reference to
indigenous people may have little impact because indigenous peoples already
fit within the Genocide Convention’s enumeration. Schabas notes that tribal
groups, which are commonly associated with indigenous peoples, 199 are
certainly “cognates of the four terms used in article II of the Convention,” a
determination supported both by Lemkin’s original conception of genocide
and, more recently, by the Darfur Commission. 200 Still, in light of the General
Assembly’s recent and particular concern over the protection of indigenous
peoples under international law, it may be practical to update the Convention’s
enumeration of protected groups with the addition of indigenous peoples to
affirm their protection from genocide under customary law.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with article II of the Genocide Convention of 1948,
national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups are protected. A reading of the
Convention’s travaux préparatoires and consideration of subsequent
international practice demonstrate that the scope of protected groups is
governed by three fundamental rules: (1) the scope of protected groups must
be exhaustive and exclusive so as to respect the prestige of the crime of
genocide; (2) the groups included must be substantially valuable to mankind,
so that their loss would be a great loss to the human race as a whole; and (3)
the groups included must be permanent and stable to the degree that
membership is, for the most part, involuntary. Since these rules constitute the
object and purpose of the Convention with respect to the scope of protected
groups, departure from the Convention’s enumeration is in danger of
disregarding the object and purpose of the Convention. As doing so would
constitute a violation of customary international law by states party to the
Convention, customary practice after 1948 has rarely recognized the protection
of groups not enumerated in the Convention.
As for the future of international law on protected groups, social and
economic groups, purposely excluded from the Convention, have the potential
to return to the debate in the impending Khmer Rouge trials taking place in the
Extraordinary Chambers, but the outlook is bleak since the Tribunal will
interpret genocide as it is defined in the Genocide Convention. The future
protection of political groups is also improbable. Considering that political
groups have been continuously and widely denied protection in international
practice, perhaps only a world event capable of rebooting the concept of
genocide would provide the needed window for political groups through which
to find protection. As the Jewish Holocaust single-handedly inspired the legal
definition of genocide that is upheld today, an event of similar significance
perpetrated exclusively on a political group would be required to validate the
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protection of political groups. It appears that indigenous peoples have the best
shot at obtaining specific protected group status as a rule of international law in
the future, considering recent efforts to recognize indigenous peoples’
collective rights under international law.
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